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In order to make sense of the world, humans tend to see causation almost everywhere.
Although most causal relations may seem straightforward, they are not always construed
in the same way cross-culturally. In this study, we investigate concepts of “chance,”
“coincidence,” or “randomness” that refer to assumed relations between intention,
action, and outcome in situations, and we ask how people from different cultures make
sense of such non-law-like connections. Based on a framework proposed by Alicke
(2000), we administered a task that aims to be a neutral tool for investigating causal
construals cross-culturally and cross-linguistically. Members of four different cultural
groups, rural Mayan Yucatec and Tseltal speakers from Mexico and urban students
from Mexico and Germany, were presented with a set of scenarios involving various
types of causal and non-causal relations and were asked to explain the described
events. Three links varied as to whether they were present or not in the scenarios:
Intention-to-Action, Action-to-Outcome, and Intention-to-Outcome. Our results show
that causality is recognized in all four cultural groups. However, how causality and
especially non-law-like relations are interpreted depends on the type of links, the cultural
background and the language used. In all three groups, Action-to-Outcome is the
decisive link for recognizing causality. Despite the fact that the two Mayan groups share
similar cultural backgrounds, they display different ideologies regarding concepts of
non-law-like relations. The data suggests that the concept of “chance” is not universal,
but seems to be an explanation that only some cultural groups draw on to make sense
of specific situations. Of particular importance is the existence of linguistic concepts in
each language that trigger ideas of causality in the responses from each cultural group.
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INTRODUCTION1
Humans see causality everywhere and in everything. Because
the interpretation of causality is so omnipresent in everyday
life, it is no surprise that it has been the subject of many
studies (Shaver, 1895; Sperber et al., 1996, inter alia; Bender and
Beller, 2011b; Bender et al., 2012). Interdisciplinary studies of
causal thinking remain, however, rare in the social sciences2.
Psychologists typically study physical and social causality in
controlled laboratory settings, but seldom consider cross-
cultural comparisons. Anthropologists, in contrast, are primarily
interested in the cultural and cross-cultural study of concepts
like “chance,” “witchcraft,” and “fate,” but seldom investigate these
questions in a rigorously controlledmanner, for example by using
experimental tasks (for exceptions see Bloch, 1998; Tomasello
et al., 2005; Astuti and Bloch, 2015). Linguists have looked
systematically at how causality is encoded in the grammar of
various languages (e.g., Wolff, 2003; Sanders and Sweetser, 2009;
Sanders et al., 2009; Kwon, 2012), yet the cultural consequences
of such variation are rarely discussed (exceptions include Evans,
2009; Bohnemeyer and Pederson, 2011; San Roque et al., 2012).
It should be noted, however, that an interdisciplinary approach
is increasingly common and has been shown to provide more
comprehensive results in various domains, especially in cross-
cultural studies (see for instance, Atran et al., 2002; Bang et al.,
2007; Bender and Beller, 2011b). This paper is an outcome of
an interdisciplinary research group that united, among others,
psychologists, anthropologists and linguists to address the issue
of causality from a cross-cultural perspective. Although our study
is mainly exploratory, we believe it shows promising results for
future cross-cultural comparisons of causal cognition.
In this paper, we explore how people in different cultural
settings explain typical causation but also exceptional relations
between events, such as non-law-like relations between cause
and effect—what in English is referred to under labels such as
1This paper is a product of the ZiF project “The Cultural Constitution of
Causal Cognition: Re-Integrating Anthropology into the Cognitive Sciences,”
organized by Andrea Bender and Sieghard Beller. It was first presented at the
Final Conference of this ZiF project on April 12, 2013. The authors’ respective
contributions are as follows: The project was initiated and the task design was
initially proposed by Friedrich and Samland; the final design and cover stories
were collectively created by the “Chance Group” of the ZiF project in which all the
authors participated. The German data were collected and coded by Samland, the
Tseltal data by Brown, and the Spanish Mexican and Yucatec data by Le Guen with
the help of Ryan Taylor who ran the task among the Mexican students in Chiapas
and Lorena Pool Balam who ran half of the Yucatec Mayas. Samland compiled the
analyses for the four groups and did the statistical analyses. The initial conference
presentation and the first draft of the paper were written by Le Guen. The revision
of the paper was a joint effort again. We would like to thank the German, Mexican
and Mayan participants, as well as the other members of the ‘Chance Group’. We
thank Andrea Bender, Anita Schroven, and the fellows of the ZiF Research Group
“The cultural constitution of causal cognition: Re-integrating anthropology into
the cognitive sciences” (Bielefeld University, Germany) for inspiring discussions,
and we thank the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen, The
Netherlands, for fieldwork funding.
2We can cite studies like Choi et al. (1999), Morris and Peng (1994), orMorris et al.
(1995), but these mainly focus on the eastern-western, individualism-collectivism
distinction, which we will not address in this paper since we consider that these are
quite arbitrary and would not apply in our study. We thank one of the reviewers
for pointing out these lines of research to us.
“chance,” “coincidence,” or “luck.” One motivation for this study
and for the chosen cultural groups lies in the fact that some
languages seem to lack words for such expressions, as is the case
in the Mayan languages in contrast with most Indo-European
languages (like German or Spanish). The main questions behind
this study are these: Do humans from different cultural groups
have a similar understanding of causality? To what extent is
causation or the absence of clear causal links interpreted in
culturally specific ways? Do people in all cultures have a concept
of “chance” or “coincidence” despite the fact that some might
lack linguistic labels for such concepts? In order to try to answer
these questions, we designed a verbal task that consists of various
systematically varied scenarios which participants are asked to
interpret. Although causal reasoning can be considered a basic
cognitive process, language is crucial not merely to express causal
relations but also, we argue, to codify them (hence to interpret
causality in terms of categories of events).
In order to explore causation across cultures and avoid
ethnocentricity, we chose not to start with a priori concepts
like “chance” or “bad luck” for instance, but instead to use a
logical combination of causal links so that our scenarios were
structurally identical across cultures. We used the framework
proposed by Alicke (2000) that was originally developed to
examine aspects of blame attribution. The central idea is that
causal relations are divided into separate links between intention,
action, and outcome. As this segmentation allows for a more
detailed analysis of the single causal components involved, it
provided a good basis for designing a “neutral” tool to investigate
causal cognition cross-culturally and cross-linguistically. Such a
tool, which we present in more detail below, allows us to examine
cultural patterns of the inferences people draw related to causality
and how these are linguistically codified.
This tool was tested within four groups of different cultural
backgrounds and languages. The four groups consist of German
students from the university of Göttingen, Mexican Spanish-
speaking students from the UNACH University (Chiapas,
Mexico), and people from two indigenous Mexican groups:
Yucatec Mayans from the Yucatec Peninsula and Tseltal Mayans
from the highlands of Chiapas. Both groups of students (German
and non-indigenous Mexican) have a high level of literacy and
live in an urban environment, while members of both Mayan
groups are in their great majority non-literate and live mainly a
peasant lifestyle based on slash and burn agriculture.
The choice of these four groups was primarily motivated by
the decision to compare groups from “western”3 cultures (i.e.,
WEIRD, western, educated, post-industrial, rich, developed,
etc., see Henrich et al., 2010), the Germans and the Mexicans,
with “non-western” (subsistence, rural, traditional) groups,
the Mayans. In addition to their lifestyle, the groups differ
linguistically: German and Spanish are Indo-European
languages; Tseltal and Yucatec are Mayan languages. We also
3Throughout we use the terms “western” and “non-western” in quotation marks
as shorthand for the more accurate WIERD term advocated by Henrich et al.
(2010), to avoid its evaluative implications, although clearly some far-eastern and
far southern cultural groups (e.g., Japanese, Australian, respectively) belong to the
“western” category and many cultural groups—including our Mayan samples—
situated in the western hemisphere belong to our “non-western” category.
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wanted to control for effects within the two language families,
i.e., the German vs. the Mexican Spanish and the Tseltal Maya
vs. the Yucatec Maya. Furthermore, the comparison between the
Mexican Spanish group and the Mayans is interesting, since all
three groups live in the same region but have quite different ways
of life.
The two Mayan groups were chosen because they lack explicit
words for “coincidence” or “chance” and, despite both groups
having related cultural and linguistic backgrounds, they seem to
have different ideas about non-law-like relations between events
(as shown below). The German student group was chosen as a
typical student sample from a western university. The Mexican
Spanish student group was included to contrast with both, the
German students and the Mayans. Mexican Spanish belongs
to the Romance family and non-indigenous Mexicans do not
share many of the Mayan cultural traits. However, Mayans and
Mexicans live in the same country and have a different way of
life from that of most European groups (like German or Iberian
Spanish people).
Causality and Non-law-like Relations
between Events
The notion of causality is omnipresent in science and in
daily life and applies to physical events as well as to human
(inter)actions. In the social domain with which we are concerned,
judgments of causality are often related to judgments about
responsibility (Sousa, 2009), blame (Shaver, 1895; Alicke, 2000),
or intentionality (Searle, 1983). In this section, we propose some
basic working definitions of what we will consider “causality” or
“causation” and what we consider to be “(non-)law-like relations
between events.” We consider causality to be the relationship
between an event 1 (the cause) and an event 2 (the effect), where
the second event is understood as a consequence or the outcome
of the first. The issue of causality is far from unproblematic
since causal reasoning is, for humans, generally based not so
much on observable processes but on assumptions that arise
by reason of observations between events or prior knowledge
(see Lagnado et al., 2007). Sometimes the relation between two
events is considered to be a causal one even without any known
causal (physical) mechanism that links the one to the other; for
example, in the social domain, where a person’s frowning can
cause another person to react. As Waldmann and Hagmayer
point out, “the main question of how we distinguish causal
relations from accidental sequences of events remains highly
debated” (Waldmann and Hagmayer, 2001, p. 28), and this is
the very reason for exploring how people from different cultural
backgrounds do or do not make this distinction and how they
differ in judging such sequences of events.
In the psychological literature about causal judgments
(based on empirical studies that are typically conducted with
undergraduates of “western” universities), statistical relations,
temporal order, intervention and prior knowledge are known
cues for causal structure, i.e., for the question whether a relation
between two events is considered to be a causal one (Lagnado
et al., 2007). However, it is known that there sometimes are
cultural differences in causal attribution (Bender and Beller,
2011a, 2013) and it is thus possible that other factors influence
the causal judgments that people who are from other cultural
backgrounds than the “western” population make.
One interesting idea in this regard is that an agent’s intentions
or desires can cause things to happen—even without any physical
connection (e.g., without being mediated by the agent’s action).
The influence of mental states like intentions on the occurrence
of events is sometimes called “magical thinking” or “mental
causation” and it has been claimed that it is more prevalent in
some cultural groups than in others. In some cultures it is, for
example, not uncommon to infer a causal relationship between
somebody’s thoughts about a snake and its appearance a few
seconds later (see Ojalehto et al., 2013). Although there may be
superstitious beliefs and magical thinking among the “western”
population too (for instance if a soccer fan believes that his
wearing a fan scarf will contribute to the chance of his team’s
win), psychological studies about causal judgments of “western”
undergraduates consistently deal with events, such as actions or
physical processes, negating the possibility that mental states can
be considered as causes for events that become manifest in the
physical world.
What is important to note, though, is that only a very low
percentage of events that are contiguous in space and time are
causally related to each other. For example, the pressing of the
doorbell button might be causally related to the doorbell ringing,
whereas the simultaneous scratching of one’s nose probably is
not. There are millions of events that happen more or less at
the same time, but most of them are not recognized as being
even possibly related to each other. When attention is driven
toward two (or more) events that happen in direct sequence but
are not known to be directly causally related, English speakers
would use words such as “chance,” “coincidence,” or “(bad) luck,”
in order to make sense of the temporal correspondence of these
events. These words refer to events that are somehow related but
leave some margin of interpretation, in contrast, for instance,
with a direct causal formulation such as “I rang the doorbell”
(which also is, in reality, an interpretation since the speaker
might not know if there is indeed a causal relation between the
pressing of the button and the bell ringing). We will refer to
concepts like “chance,” “coincidence,” or “(bad) luck” as “non-
law-like relationship explanations,” in contrast to direct causal
explanations for events.
An interesting framework to account for the influence
of “mechanical” connections between an action and an
outcome, the use of non-law-like-relationship explanations and
the influence of mental states on the attribution of causal
relationships is provided by Alicke’s Culpable Control Model
(Alicke, 2000), which was developed to capture lay people’s
blame judgments. In this model, the causal impact of an agent’s
action on an outcome (i.e., Causal Control) is only one of
three components of personal control which is crucial to blame
and responsibility judgments. Next to this causal control link
between action and outcome (A→O; also considered behavior
to consequence by Alicke), blame evaluations are also based
on volitional behavior control that is represented by the link
from intention to action (I→A; or mind to behavior) and
on volitional outcome control represented by the link from
intention to outcome (I→O; or mind to consequence). Whereas
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the Intention-to-Action link determines whether an action was
intended or not, the Intention-to-Outcome link defines the desire
of the agent, i.e., whether (s)he foresaw and wanted the outcome
event to happen. Personal control, which is crucial to blame
judgments, is maximized if all three links are present: an agent
who wanted the outcome to happen and who intentionally
performed a certain action that caused the outcome is more
blameworthy than an agent whose accidental action caused an
outcome (s)he did not want (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, 2008). If
a boy breaks his neighbor’s window, for example, his action is
usually considered to be more blameworthy when he wanted
to destroy the window and intentionally kicked a ball in the
direction of his neighbor’s house compared to a situation in
which he accidentally broke it, without wanting it or being able
to foresee that his shot could lead to this damage.
Although evaluations of blame and responsibility will not
be directly addressed in this study, we consider Alicke’s
structural linkages to serve as a neutral framework for
our aim of investigating causal attribution and non-law-like
relationship attributions in social contexts among people from
different cultures. As mentioned earlier, we are especially
interested in evaluating the extent to which participants consider
intentionality to be relevant with regard to the realization of
the outcome. One hypothesis is that, in some cultural contexts,
intentionality is not considered to be a relevant element for the
attribution of causality. According to this hypothesis, A→O is
the most relevant link, with or without the I→O or I→A link,
and whenever it is missing the relationship is seen as non-law-
like. Another hypothesis is that, in contrast, mental states can
be seen as adequate causes for physical events, so that, in the
most extreme case, the I→O link is sufficient for the attribution
of a causal relationship. This attribution of a causal relation
between an intention and an outcome without obvious causal
links involving physical actions can be seen as an example of
“magical thinking.” Based on the fact that legal systems all over
the world consider the actual actions of a person (and not his or
her mental states) as important for convicting him or her, and
based on psychological studies of causal attribution, we predict
that in every culture the Action-to-Outcome (A→O) link will
be the most important for attributing causation. However, the
anthropological literature suggests that the principle of magical
thinking might be more relevant in certain “non-western”
cultural groups compared with those in “western” societies; i.e.,
although in most “western” cultures intentionality is important
in blame attribution, it is less often considered a relevant causal
factor. We therefore anticipate that intentionality might have
more weight in the non-western samples. We will elaborate
our predictions in Section Predictions and discuss this issue in
relation to our results in Section Cross-cultural Comparison of
the Conceptualization of Causality.
The Linguistics of Causality
While the previous section was concerned with ideas and
cultural preferences regarding concepts of causality, we want to
emphasize the point that ideas and concepts are also (maybe
sometimes even essentially) encoded in words. In every language,
words and grammatical structures are not simply a tool for
expressing pre-existing thoughts, but they also, to some extent,
guide thinking processes (Sapir, 1933; Whorf, 1956; Lucy, 1992).
For anthropologists as well as for linguists and cross-cultural
psychologists, attention to lexical categories is crucial, for they
represent “conceptual packages” with which speakers analyze and
categorize their physical and social worlds. This point has been
made extensively in the literature about color terms, for instance
(Berlin and Kay, 1969; Hardin and Maffi, 1997; Levinson, 2000).
Although colors can be objectively categorized using a color
chart, color terms in any specific language cut the color space
into categories, and different languages do this differently. The
implications of this—including the extent to which the “linguistic
relativity” hypothesis is valid (i.e., how people construe the world
based on linguistic variations)—have been hotly debated (Lucy,
1992; Gumperz and Levinson, 1996).
Why is this debate important for a cross-cultural and cross-
linguistic analysis of (exceptional) causality? The answer is
simple: If people do not have a lexical label to express a concept
like “chance,” “accident,” “coincidence,” they might not be able
to interpret events that speakers of other languages construe
as falling into those categories. Additionally, local folk theories
might encourage the idea of a uni-causal interpretation. Thus,
people from different cultural contexts and different language
communities would give different explanations for the same
situation. These explanations might or might not vary from each
other in terms of causation but still be systematic within each
community. How much people’s judgments will be consistent
and how much disparity there is across the interpretations of
members of the same group were exactly the questions that drove
our research.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Because our aim is to determine how participants from different
cultures conceptualize causal links between events and, in
particular, if they have some word or expression to relate events
with each other in a non-law-like way, we designed a task that
involved different scenarios under various conditions following a
systematic structure. According to that structure eight scenarios
represented different configurations of causal links, which were
instantiated in eight cover stories providing different content to
the causal structures (see details in Section Materials).
Participants4
The German sample was composed of 64 participants, all
students recruited from the campus of the University of
Göttingen (Germany). Among the participants there were 32
women, 31 men, and one person who didn’t specify his or her
gender. The mean age was 24.97 (SD = 4.55). One person did
not specify age. German participants were asked spontaneously
on campus, mostly in cafeterias. They received sweets as
compensation.
4For the data collection in Germany and Mexico, an approval by an ethical board
was not requested due to the small scale and non-critical nature of the study.
The study was carried out in accordance with the ethical recommendations of the
German Psychological Society (DGPs).
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The Yucatec Maya sample was composed of 16 participants
(nine women), all native speakers of Yucatec Maya; 14 were
from the village of Kopchen (state of Quintana Roo) and two
females from the village of Chican (state of Yucatán). Their
mean age was 38.4 years (ranging from 18 to 50). None of the
participants had more than a high school degree. Although all
are native speakers of Yucatec Maya, some also speak Spanish.
Yucatec Mayans participants were compensated indirectly
through gifts, following a fieldwork procedure used since 2002 by
Le Guen.
The Tseltal Maya sample was composed of 16 participants
(eight women) all native speakers of Tseltal; all were from the
community of Tenejapa (state of Chiapas). Their mean age
was 32.8 years (ranging from 23 to 58). Education level varied;
none had more than a high school degree. Tseltal participants
volunteered in response to Brown’s invitation to participate to the
study. Each participant received 70Mexican pesos per session (in
which they also participated in other tasks).
The Mexican sample was composed of eight students from an
undergraduate Spanish literature class at the UNACH University
(Universidad Autonoma de Chiapas), studying for their Bachelor
degree. Four of the students were female. All were from the
state of Chiapas and all were native speakers of Spanish (one
participant said he also speaks Mam (a Mayan language) but
considers himself to be Mestizo, i.e., from the Mexican Spanish
culture). The mean age of participants was 20.4 (between 18 and
24). Participants were offered candy or coffee as remuneration.
Materials
We used the structural linkages of the Culpable Control Model by
Alicke (2000) as the basis for designing our task. In this model,
the relation between the intentionality of an agent, the action and
the outcome is divided into three links: Intention-to-Outcome,
Intention-to-Action, and Action-to-Outcome. The presence of
the Intention-to-Outcome link (I→O) implies the desire of an
agent that a certain event (the outcome) shall happen whereas
its absence implies that the agent neither foresaw nor wanted
the outcome to happen. The presence of the Intention-to-Action
link (I→A) implies that the agent intended a certain action. This
link can be present even though the Intention-to-Outcome link
is absent and vice versa (see scenarios 3, 5, 6, and 7). Finally,
the presence of the Action-to-Outcome link (A→O) implies that
the action leads to a particular outcome. All combinations of
the presence and absence of the mentioned three links lead to
eight different scenarios, each with a unique pattern of links.
Table 1 presents all eight combinations of the three possible
links.
Scenarios 1 and 8 will be considered our baseline scenarios.
Scenario 1, with all three causal links present, exemplifies a case
of direct causation. For instance, consider the case of a successful
event of killing a deer (our cover story 1). A hunter wants a dead
deer (i.e., the I→O link is given, as there is an intention to an
outcome), so he pulls the trigger with the purpose of shooting at
the deer (i.e., the I→A link is given, as there is an intention to
an action fulfilled). Eventually, the shot of the hunter leads to the
dead deer (i.e., the A→O link is also given, as the action and the
respective outcome are realized).
TABLE 1 | For each scenario (Sc), the structure considers the combination
of the three possible links: Intention to Outcome (I→O), Intention to
Action (I→A), and Action to Outcome (A→O).
English gloss Links
I → O I → A A → O
Sc1 “direct causality”
√ √ √
Sc2 “failure”
√ √
–
Sc3 “accident” –
√ √
Sc4 “luck”
√
–
√
Sc5 “unintentional” – –
√
Sc6 “magical thinking”
√
– –
Sc7 “intended action” –
√
–
Sc8 “pure coincidence” – – –
The signs
√
and – represent, respectively, the presence or the absence of a link.
By contrast, scenario 8 is made up of purely coincidental
events, that is, the three events just happen at the same time
without any obvious causal link present between them, as, for
example: A hunter goes into the forest and wants to clean his gun
(i.e., no intention to kill the deer). While cleaning the trigger he
accidentally pulls it. The gun doesn’t fire because there was no
bullet in the barrel. At the same moment a deer falls down, dead,
some meters away from the hunter (i.e., no action from the agent
leads to the outcome)5.
Scenario 2, where the link Action-to-Outcome is absent, is a
typical case of failure, since intentionality is present but does not
make the outcome happen. Scenario 3, which lacks the Intention-
to-Outcome link, could be considered a case of accident, because
there is an intention toward the action but no intention toward
the outcome. Scenario 4, which lacks the Intention-to-Action link
can be considered a prototypical case of luck. In the literature,
this scenario has been referred to as a “deviant” causal chain
(Chisholm, 1966; Searle, 1983; Pizarro et al., 2003). Scenario 5
can be referred to as unintentional as it represents a case in which
neither the intention toward the action nor the intention toward
the outcome is present, although, in the end, the outcome is
caused by the action of the agent. Scenario 6, which presents
only the Intention-to-Outcome link, is a case ofmagical thinking:
the agent wants the outcome to happen and events (magically)
turn out to comply with his or her wishes. Again, taking our
cover story 1 as an example: A hunter wants a dead deer (i.e.,
link 1 is fulfilled, for there is an intention to an outcome). While
walking in the forest he stumbles over a root and pulls the trigger
accidentally. The gun does not fire because there was no bullet in
the barrel (i.e., no intention leading to an action). At the same
5Although scenario 8 could be considered as purely coincidental, it is also likely
that, because of the interactional context of the task where participants are asked
to judge scenarios, such a story triggers the assumption that some relevance
must exist between the different events narrated. Indeed, the default assumption
when someone tells a story is that it should have some relevance or some
communicational intent (Grice, 1957). Consequently, we expected either that
participants would see no causal link (i.e., consider it pure coincidence) or that
they would be puzzled and perhaps invent some causal link not originally present
in the story. In this latter case, we anticipated considerable inconsistency among
participants of the same cultural group as well as between groups.
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moment a deer falls down, dead, some meters away from the
hunter (i.e., no action from the agent leads to the outcome).
Finally, scenario 7 (intended action), with only the Intention-to-
Action link, represents a situation in which an outcome happened
that was neither intended nor was it the result of the agent’s
action.
What is important to note is that even while the eight
scenarios differ regarding their constellation of linkages, there
are three factors that remain constant across all scenarios: (a)
there is always an agent mentioned whose behavior (event 1) is
temporally and spatially near to the outcome (event 2), (b) the
behavior of the agent leads to an event that happens constantly
regardless of whether it is intended by the agent, and (c) all
scenarios end with a similar outcome (e.g., the deer being dead,
the window being broken, etc.).
Eight different cover stories were created, so that each scenario
was combined once with each cover story leading to 64 different
story-scenario-combinations. These were created to control for
content effects; the stories have a different content but share the
causal-link structure of the eight scenarios. With eight different
scenarios and eight different cover stories we were able to vary
possible combinations of the two to counterbalance our data in
order to improve its reliability. The eight cover stories are the
following:
1. A hunter shooting a deer
2. A boy kicking a ball and breaking a window
3. A fisher fishing a fish
4. A woman starting a fire
5. A woman breaking a plate, waking up her husband
6. A man spilling a drink on his boss
7. A man cutting down a cornstalk
8. A man killing an insect with a newspaper.
Stories were originally designed in English and then translated
into the four languages. In the choice of contents, a main priority
was to be as culturally neutral as possible. Alicke (Alicke, 2000;
Alicke et al., 2008) was primarily interested in blame attribution,
and in his model he recognizes the role of norms as fundamental
as much as the valence of the outcome (positive or negative). This
is why we avoided outcomes with strong valence (like human
death or severe injuries), especially because human agents are
involved in every story. Careful attention was taken to have
culturally interpretable content of the stories also for the two
Mayan groups6.
Design and Procedure
Design
The eight cover stories were designed in order to control for
content effects. The strategy of assignment of the scenarios/cover
stories to the participants differed across the four groups. For the
6Brown has been working for more than 40 years among the Tseltal Maya and
Le Guen for almost 15 years among the Yucatec. Both are fluent in the local
language (which they exclusively use for all interactions) and have been conducting
ethnographic and linguistic studies as well as (psycho-) linguistic tasks for many
years. Because of their experience (and the consulting of a native speaker in the
case of Le Guen), possible cultural incongruities in the scenarios were avoided.
Mexican Spanish, the Tseltal and the Yucatec participants, the
full set of cover stories was used. Each participant got all eight
scenarios, each with a different cover story, in a pre-randomized
order that is presented in Appendix 1 of Supplementary Material.
For the eight Mexican Spanish subjects this results in one data
point for each scenario. For the two Mayan groups, after the first
eight participants, the same structure was repeated with the next
eight participants, resulting in two data points for each scenario.
In Germany, only two stories (taken randomly from the eight
cover stories) were presented to each participant since it was
possible to recruit many more subjects compared to the other
three groups. The two stories presented to a participant were
randomly combined; the assignment was restricted in three ways:
(1) every scenario for every cover story had to be assigned twice,
one participant could neither (2) get two different scenarios for
the same cover story nor, (3) the same scenario for two different
cover stories. Each participant thus got two different scenarios
with two different cover stories. The described procedure also
results in two data points for each scenario.
Procedure
The scenarios were presented to the participants in their
native tongue in a randomized order (given in Appendix 1 of
Supplementary Material). In the case of the German students, the
subjects were given the task on a sheet of paper and participants
noted their answers down. For the other three groups, the
cover stories/scenarios were presented orally; they were read as
many times as necessary for the participant to understand them
correctly. Participants answered verbally and their responses
were noted on a note pad. Responses were also audio-recorded
for the Mexican Spanish and the Tseltal and video recorded for
the Yucatec.
Participants were asked to provide an interpretation of the
(assumed) causal or other relation between the links for each
scenario. They were asked three questions:
1. Temporal question: Why did the outcome occur just then?
2. Agency question: Did the actor cause the outcome to
happen?
3. Counterfactual question: If the actor had not been there,
would the outcome have happened anyway?
The first question was an open, temporal question on the
timing of the outcome: “Why did the outcome occur just then?”
The temporal criterion is fundamental in order to assess the
coincidence of events. As pointed out by Hume (2003) and
Lagnado and Channon (2008)7, people’s attribution of causal
relations can vary if events are considered earlier or later in the
chain of events. As Alicke (2000) suggests, a closer proximity
between action and the outcome might reveal a greater control
by the agent and a higher degree of causality. This question,
prompting for a free interpretation of the scenario, also enabled
us to make a linguistic analysis of the concepts participants used
to characterize the event described.
7The latter consider the criteria of “location,” but time and space are closely linked
in our scenarios.
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The second question focuses on the agency of the actor:
“Did the actor cause the outcome to happen?”8. This was asked
to determine whether participants recognize a causal relation
between the intention or the action of the agent regarding the
outcome.
The final question is formulated counterfactually: “If the actor
had not been there, would the outcome have happened anyway?”
This question was designed to determine how participants
consider the agent to be determinant in the outcome (it contrasts
directly with the agency question). It is important to point out
that while the open question was aimed at eliciting explanations
of the event, the two closed questions addressed directly the
(causal) involvement of the agent in each scenario.
Coding
All answers were translated back into English in order to allow
for multiple coders. Questions 2 and 3 triggered yes/no/I don’t
know answers and these three types of answers were considered.
Question 1 was an open question, so answers were coded into one
of six mutually exclusive categories according to the following
criteria.
(1) Causal Story-based Explanations. Answers in this category
include a causal connection between the agent mentioned
in the story (or a part of the mechanism between the agent’s
action and the outcome) and the outcome.When the Action-
to-Outcome link was present (i.e., in scenarios 1, 3, 4, and 5),
it suggests that participants recognized the causal connection
between the agent’s action and the outcome. By contrast,
when the scenario structure did not have the Action-to-
Outcome link, it suggests that the participant did not accept
the scenario as such, but created a causal connection from
the agent to the outcome although it was not originally
present.
(2) Causal Imposed Explanations. Answers in this category
include an invented causal connection between a causal
factor that was not mentioned originally in the story and the
outcome. Examples of such answers are: “There was another
hunter who shot the deer at the same time” (cover story 1) or
“something hit the window, though it wasn’t the ball” (cover
story 2).
(3) No cause, it happened by itself, chance, coincidence. Answers
that belong to this category are those where the agent
mentioned in the story has nothing to do with the outcome
and no other causal mechanism is added by the participant
in order tomake sense of the story. Examples of such answers
are: “it was chance that the deer died in that moment” (cover
story 1) or “it fell down all by itself ” (cover story 6).
(4) Fate, destiny. Answers belonging to this category suggest that
the outcome happened because it was “meant to be,” without
the participant specifying any other causal mechanism.
Examples of such answers are: “it was [the] destiny [of the
deer to die]” or “it was [the fisher’s] fate to catch [the fish],
8We used the direct transitive formulation, e.g., “Did the hunter kill the deer?,”
rather than the periphrastic formulation “Did the hunter cause the deer to die,”
as the transitive is the least marked way to formulate this question about direct
causation.
God took it out of the water so the fisher could catch it”
(cover story 3). A typical word used in Yucatec Maya was
sweerte “fate,” or equivalently, Schicksal “karma, fate, destiny”
among the German participants.
(5) I don’t know. Answers belonging to this category suggest that
the participant could not name a specific causal factor or
could not categorize the story under a specific label. It is also
the case that an “I don’t know”-response reflects some degree
of insecurity.
(6) Miscellaneous, not classifiable. Answers that did not belong to
any of the previous categories were coded as not classifiable.
Such answers generally revealed that the participant did not
answer the question or that the answer was unrelated to the
question (e.g., “people will still say it’s [the boy who broke the
window]”) (cover story 2).
Because these were open answers, we decided to conduct a test of
inter-rater reliability. The specialist of each cultural group coded
the answers and translated them into English. A second coder
blind-coded the first coder’s answers, and, for cases in which the
two raters did not agree, a third, independent rater decided which
category the open answer in question was to be assigned to. For
the German sample, the inter-rater reliability for the two raters
was found to be excellent (κ = 0.97) according to Landis and
Koch (1977). Reliability was lower, but nevertheless substantial
agreement could be found both for the two raters of the Tseltal
participants’ answers (κ = 0.78) and for the two raters of the
answers of the Yucatec subjects (κ = 0.68). For the Mexican
Spanish participants, the inter-rater reliability for the two raters
was only moderate (κ = 0.50). The differences in reliability partly
reflect the extent to which a rater had prepared his or her coding
task beforehand, but they also result of how much open answers
were detailed. The answers of the German participants, for
instance, were very detailed—perhaps because they were written
down instead of orally given. It could therefore have been easier
to classify them. However, the agreement between two raters on
the assignment of categories was at least “substantial” for three
of the four groups and the worst degree of agreement was still
“moderate” (after Landis and Koch, 1977). We therefore consider
the implementation of the coding system to be successful and that
our use of the open answer-data is justified.
Predictions
One main concern in this study is to explore the ways in which
different cultural groups consider what we could consider “core
or basic causality.” In particular, we are interested in the causal
link between an Action and an Outcome (A→O), which is
classically referred to as “causality” in Western societies. There
are two possibilities: first, either all participants from every
culture consider this link as fundamental or, alternatively, in
some cultures this link is not taken to be so important in
relation to other links (like Intention-to-Outcome or Intention-
to-Action).
The Action-to-Outcome link determines whether an agent’s
action is seen as the cause of an outcome or not. The interest of
considering the relevance of the Action-to-Outcome link for the
interpretation of causality cross-culturally primarily lies in the
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TABLE 2 | Percentage of Yes-Answers to the question “Did the agent cause the outcome to happen?” for each language and for the presence and
absence of each link.
Language Percentage of Yes-Answers
A-O link present A-O link absent I-A link present I-A link absent I-O link present I-O link Absent
(sc. 1, 3, 4, and 5) (sc. 2, 6, 7, and 8) (sc. 1, 2, 3, and 7) (sc. 4, 5, 6, and 8) (sc. 1, 2, 4, and 6) (sc. 3, 5, 7, and 8)
German 79.69 21.88 40.63 60.94a 54.69 46.88
Tseltal 57.81 29.69 50.00 37.50 54.69 32.81
Yucatec 89.06 42.19 73.44 57.81 67.19 64.06
Mexican Spanish 59.38 25.00 37.50 46.88 46.88 37.50
Note that each scenario was answered by 16 German, 16 Tseltal, 16 Yucatec, and 8 Mexican Spanish participants so that the percentages in each column refer to 64 German, 64
Tseltal, 64 Yucatec, and 32 Mexican Spanish participants.
aThe German and Mexican Spanish subjects gave more “yes” answers in the absence compared to the presence of the I→A link. This difference can be explained by the presence or
absence of the A→O link: there generally tend to be more “yes” answers for those scenarios in which the A→O link is present (1, 3, 4, 5) and more “no” answers in those in which the
A→O link is absent (2, 6, 7, 8). Regarding the four scenarios in which the I→A link is absent, for instance, the higher percentage of “yes” answers can solely be attributed to the two
scenarios 4 and 5 in which the A→O link is present (German subjects: 15 “yes” and 1 “no” answer to scenario 4, 13 “yes” and 2 “no” answers to scenario 5, 6 “yes” and 6 “no” answers
to scenario 6, 5 “yes” and 10 “no” answers to scenario 8; Mexican Spanish subjects: 5 “yes” and 3 “no” answers to scenario 4, 5 “yes” and 3 “no” answers to scenario 5, 2 “yes” and
6 “no” answers to scenario 6, 3 “yes” and 4 “no” answers to scenario 8).
fact that in the anthropological literature, it was a frequent claim
among early ethnographers that members of many non-western
cultural groups base a lot of their daily behavior on the principle
of “magical thinking,” mostly related to various kinds of taboos
(Frazer, 1911; Lévy-Bruhl, 1922; Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Lévi-
Strauss, 1990; Malinowski, 1992), see discussion in section Cross-
cultural Comparison of the Conceptualization of Causality.
According to this notion, the other two links, (Intention-to-
Outcome and Intention-to-Action) could likewise contribute to
the perception of causality. If some cultural differences were
to be expected, they would be between the German and the
Mexican participants on the one hand, who should behave in the
way expected of “western” groups, and the Tseltal and Yucatec
participants on the other hand, who might show evidence
of the kind of reliance on the I-O link typical of “magical
thinking.”
RESULTS
We examine the results according to the three questions we
asked our participants. For practical reasons, we consider first the
agency question (Did the actor cause the outcome to happen?),
then the counterfactual question (If the actor had not been there,
would the outcome have happened anyway?) and finally the
open, temporal question (Why did the outcome occur just then?).
We look at both differences within cultures, depending on the
absence or presence of each link (A→O, I→A, and I→O), and
differences between cultures, given the presence of each link.
The Agency Question
Answers to the question “Did the actor cause the outcome to
happen?” reveal how much participants attribute causation to
the actor in each scenario, and allow us to determine how
much weight the different links are given in the recognition of
causation. This question could be answered with “yes,” “no,” or
“maybe.” A yes-answer would indicate that the agent is seen
as cause of the outcome. For the calculation of the within-
group contrasts, we used a 2 (link present vs. link absent) × 3
(response: yes/no/maybe) contingency table9. For the between-
group contrasts, we used a 2 (group 1 vs. group 2) × 3
(yes/no/maybe) contingency table for the presence-case of each
link (A→O, I→A, and I→O). The descriptive results are
presented in Table 2.
Comparison within Cultures
For subjects of all four cultural backgrounds, the only significant
differences between the absence and the presence of a link were
found for the A→O link: if it is present, the agent is significantly
more often seen as cause compared to when it is absent [German:
χ
2
(2, N= 128)
10 = 43.51; p < 0.001, Tseltal: χ2
(2, N= 128) = 10.86;
p = 0.004, Yucatec: χ2
(2, N= 128) = 31.38; p < 0.001, Mexican
Spanish: χ2
(2, N= 64) = 9.36; p = 0.009]. Only for the Tseltal
subjects, a second link seems to have been important in order
to answer the question: the I→O link. They stated significantly
more often that the agent did not cause the outcome if the
outcome was not intended compared to when it was intended
[χ2
(2, N= 128) = 6.88; p = 0.03].
So as predicted, for the participants of all four cultural
backgrounds the most important link to decide whether an
agent caused the outcome is the link from the agent’s action to
the outcome. However, there could be differences regarding the
importance of the links between the participants of the different
cultural backgrounds; that the agent’s action caused the outcome,
for instance, could still be more important for some than for
others.
Comparison between Cultures
To see whether there are differences in the relative importance
of the three links between participants of the four cultural
backgrounds, we analyzed the differences between every pair of
9Please note that in some cases two of the six cells were empty (no “maybe”
responses). In these cases, a 2× 2 contingency table was considered.
10Please note that in all chi-square tests, the N reported represents the number of
data points of the comparison, and not the number of participants.
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groups, resulting in six comparisons: German–Tseltal, German–
Yucatec, German–Mexican Spanish, Tseltal–Yucatec, Tseltal–
Mexican Spanish and Yucatec–Mexican Spanish11.
If the A→O link is present, the vast majority of the
German subjects see the agent as cause (79.69%). Their answer
pattern is different from that of the Tseltal and Mexican
subjects [German–Tseltal: χ2
(2, N = 128) = 17.54; p < 0.001,
German–Mexican Spanish: χ2
(2, N = 96) = 11.42; p = 0.003]. A
consideration of the adjusted standardized residuals12 revealed
that these differences were due to the preponderant majority
of German subjects endorsing the agent as a cause compared
to more evenly distributed answers in the Tseltal and Mexican-
Spanish samples and, at least for the German-Tseltal comparison,
due tomore “maybe”-answers on the part of the German subjects.
The answer pattern of the Yucatec subjects resembles that of the
Germans (the general answer pattern did not differ significantly;
χ
2
(2, N= 128) = 5.4; p = 0.067); the adjusted standardized
residuals merely revealed that the Germans gave more maybe-
answers compared to the Yucatec sample (see Appendix 2
in Supplementary Material). Also the Yucatec–Tseltal and the
Yucatec–Mexican comparison revealed significant differences:
Yucatec subjects less often deny and more often state that the
agent is the cause if the A→O link was present in comparison
with the Tseltal subjects [χ2
(1,N= 128) = 16.02; p < 0.001] or the
Mexican Spanish subjects [χ2
(1, N= 96) = 11.4; p < 0.001].
If the I→A link is present, the answer pattern of the German
subjects differs significantly from that of the Tseltal subjects
[χ2
(2, N= 128) = 12.04; p = 0.002]. The adjusted standardized
residuals indicate that this difference stems from more “maybe”-
answers of the German subjects. This finding, however, might be
due to differences in how the data were collected: the German
subjects were given a written questionnaire with “maybe” as
an answer option whereas the Tseltal subjects were asked to
answer verbally and thus the answer “maybe” might not have
come readily to their mind. For the Yucatec participants, the
agent is more often seen as the cause of the outcome if
he intended the action than for the German and Mexican
subjects (German–Yucatec: χ2
(2, N= 128) = 17.19; p < 0.001,
Yucatec–Mexican χ2
(2, N= 96) = 11.87; p = 0.003). The German
participants, additionally, gave more “maybe”-answers compared
to the Yucatec participants, as the adjusted standardized residuals
indicate.
Regarding the I→O link, only the German subjects seem to
have given a slightly different answer pattern compared to the
Tseltal [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 13.57; p = 0.001]. This is, as the analysis
of the adjusted standardized residuals indicates, again due to the
higher frequency of maybe-answers from the German subjects.
11We used Bonferroni-corrected p-values for the six single comparisons between
the languages so that the chi-square results were considered to be significant if the
corresponding p-value was lower than 0.008 in these cases.
12As proposed by one reviewer, we looked at the adjusted standardized residuals
to determine which cells contributed most to the significant differences indicated
by the conducted chi-square tests. Values higher than 2 or lower than −2 were
considered to make a big contribution and the corresponding results are thus
reported in the text. The tables with all adjusted standardized residuals are also
provided in Appendix 2 of Supplementary Material.
Summary
The results from the agency question overall show that
intentionality does not play the major role for attributing
causality to an agent, at least among these four cultural groups,
while the A→O link seems to be the most important one
for determining whether an agent is the cause of an outcome.
However, there are differences between participants from the
four cultural backgrounds: compared to the German and Yucatec
subjects, the Tseltal and Mexican Spanish subjects deny the
agent’s causal role more often even when the story is more
likely to represent the agent’s action as causing the outcome.
In addition, compared to the other three groups the Yucatec
participants see the agent more often as cause even if he merely
intended the action. For some cultural groups, the intentionality
of an action therefore seems to play an additional role in their
causal attributions.
Counterfactual Factor
The counterfactual question (“If the actor had not been there,
would the outcome have happened anyway?”) was designed
to test whether counterfactual evidence would cancel a causal
interpretation. Possible answers for this question were again
“yes,” “no” or “maybe.” Note, however, that the representation
of the agent as cause of the outcome would be indicated by
a negation of the question (“No, the outcome would not have
happened without the agent being there”). The within-contrasts
were again calculated using a 2 (link present vs. link absent) × 3
(response: yes/no/maybe) contingency table (Tseltal and Yucatec
participants were less likely to answer “maybe”; see footnote
8). The between-contrasts, again, were calculated using a 2
(group 1 vs. group 2) × 3 (yes/no/maybe) contingency table for
the presence-case of each link (A→O, I→A, and I→O). The
descriptive results are presented in Table 3.
Comparison within Cultures
As for the agency question, the only significant differences
between the absence and presence of one link can be found
for the A→O link. If the agent’s action caused the outcome,
more participants say that the outcome would not have happened
without the agent’s presence than that it would have happened
without him. This difference is significant for the German
subjects [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 33.91; p < 0.001], for the Tseltal subjects
[χ2
(2, N= 128) = 15.72; p < 0.001], for the Yucatec subjects
[χ2
(1, N= 128) = 27.81; p < 0.001] and marginally significant for
the Mexican Spanish subjects [χ2
(2, N= 64) = 5.48; p = 0.06].
The responses of the majority of subjects of all cultural
backgrounds indicate that, in cases in which the A→O link is
present, the outcome would not have happened if the agent had
not been there.
Comparison between Cultures
For both the Tseltal and the Yucatec subjects, the comparisons
with the other cultural groups revealed significant differences
if the A→O link is present. All Tseltal participants denied
that the outcome would have happened without the agent and
thus gave more no-answers and less maybe-answers than the
German subjects [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 18.29; p < 0.001], although
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TABLE 3 | Percentage of No-Answers to the question “If the actor had not been there, would the outcome have happened anyway?” for each language
and for the presence and absence of each link.
Language Percentage of No-Answers
A–O link present A–O link absent I–A link present I–A link absent I–O link present I–O link absent
(sc. 1, 3, 4, and 5) (sc. 2, 6, 7, and 8) (sc. 1, 2, 3, and 7) (sc. 4, 5, 6, and 8) (sc. 1, 2, 4, and 6) (sc. 3, 5, 7, and 8)
German 75.00 25.00 43.75 56.25a 50.00 50.00
Tseltal 100.00 78.13 89.06 89.06 89.06 89.06
Yucatec 84.38 39.06 65.63 57.81 56.25 67.19
Mexican Spanish 68.75 40.63 43.75 65.63 62.50 46.88
Note that each scenario was answered by 16 German, 16 Tseltal, 16 Yucatec, and 8 Mexican Spanish participants so that the percentages in each column refer to 64 German, 64
Tseltal, 64 Yucatec and 32 Mexican Spanish participants.
aAs already noted for question 2, the German and Mexican Spanish subjects gave more “yes” answers to question 3 if the I→A link was absent compared to when it was present.
The Yucatec subjects gave more “yes” answers if the I→O link was absent compared to when it was present. These differences can predominantly likewise be also be attributed to the
presence of the A→O link. This link was present in two of the four scenarios in which the I→A link was absent, scenarios 4 and 5, and also in two of the four scenarios in which the I→O
link was absent, scenarios 3 and 5. (German subjects: 1 “yes” and 13 “no” answers to scenario 4, 3 “yes” and 13 “no” answers to scenario 5, 7 “yes” and 3 “no” answers to scenario 6,
7 “yes” and 7 “no” answers to scenario 8; Mexican Spanish subjects: 0 “yes” and 7 “no” answers to scenario 4, 1 “yes” and 5 “no” answers to scenario 5, 0 “yes” and 6 “no” answers
to scenario 6, 2 “yes” and 3 “no” answers to scenario 8; Yucatec subjects: 2 “yes” and 14 “no” answers to scenario 3, 2 “yes”—and 14 “no” answers to scenario 5, 8 “yes” and 8 “no”
answers to scenario 7, 9 “yes” and 7 “no” answers to scenario 8.)
the majority of German subjects also answered “no” (75%). For
the same reason (because of the large amount of no-answers
on the part of the Tseltal), the comparison with the Yucatec
and Mexican subjects also reveals significant differences [Tseltal–
Yucatec: χ2
(1, N= 128) = 10.85; p < 0.001, Tseltal-Mexican:
χ
2
(2, N= 96) = 22.34; p < 0.001]. In addition, the Yucatec
subjects’ answer pattern differs significantly from that of the
Germans [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 11.35; p = 0.003] and Mexican subjects
[χ2
(2, N= 96) = 15.27; p < 0.001]: both the German and the
Mexican Spanish participants gave more maybe-answers than the
Yucatec participants, as the analysis of the adjusted standardized
residuals revealed.
So, given the presence of the A→O link, all Tseltal subjects
answered “no” to the counterfactual question as to whether the
outcome would have happened if the agent had not been there.
The Yucatec participants sometimes answered “yes,” and only
the German and Mexican participants also answered “maybe”
(although rarely).
Regarding the importance of the I→A link, again for both
the Tseltal and the Yucatec subjects, the comparisons with the
other cultural groups revealed significant differences concerning
their answers if the I→A link is present. Compared to the
German subjects [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 29.48; p < 0.001], the Yucatec
subjects [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 20.71; p < 0.001] and the Mexican
subjects [χ2
(2, N= 96) = 22.75; p < 0.001], the Tseltal subjects
gave significantly more no-answers if the agent intended his
action, suggesting that he was seen to be a causal agent based
on the presence of the I→A link. As likewise indicated by
the adjusted standardized residuals, the German and Mexican
Spanish participants also gave more maybe-answers compared to
the Tseltal participants.
Also for the Yucatec subjects, however, the presence of the
I→A link seems to influence the representation of the agent as
cause in a stronger way than for the German [χ2
(2, N= 128) =
22.44; p < 0.001] and Mexican subjects [χ2
(2, N= 96) = 22.35; p <
0.001]. Compared to them, the adjusted standardized residuals
show that the Yucatec participants gave more no-answers and
fewer maybe-answers—indicating that they considered the agent
to be “more causal” if the I→A link was present.
Finally, as for the other two links, the comparisons between
the Tseltal and the Yucatec subjects with all other cultural groups
revealed significant differences concerning their answers if the
I→O link is present. The Tseltal subjects denied significantly
more often that the outcome would have occurred without
the agent if the outcome was intended by the agent compared
to the German [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 23.19; p < 0.001], Yucatec
[χ2
(2, N= 128) = 25.74; p < 0.001] and Mexican participants
[χ2
(2, N= 96) = 9.93; p = 0.007]. The role of the link between
intention and outcome therefore seems to be most important
for the Tseltal subjects: if the I→O link is present, the agent is
seen as “more causal.” The German and Mexican subjects, again,
also gave more maybe-answers than the Tseltal participants.
Interestingly, the Yucatec subjects gave more yes-answers and
fewer maybe-answers than the Mexican subjects [χ2
(2, N= 96) =
19.05; p < 0.001] and the German subjects [χ2
(2, N= 128) = 25.74;
p < 0.001] as the adjusted standardized residuals reveal. This
indicates that, compared to the German and Mexican subjects,
the agent is “less causal” for the Yucatec participants if the I→O
link is present. However, the Yucatec participants did not give
fewer no-answers compared to these two samples (see Appendix
2 in Supplementary Material)—which would be the necessary
counterpart for this conclusion—suggesting that this result might
be an artifact resulting from the general tendency of the Yucatec
participants to not give maybe-answers.
Summary
For the participants of all cultural backgrounds, the A→O link
was the most important link to determine whether the outcome
would have happened in the absence of the agent. However,
there were differences across the four groups. Whereas for
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the German and Mexican subjects, the presence of the A→O
link seems to have been the only relevant information for
answering the counterfactual question, the Yucatec participants
and evenmore so the Tseltal participants seem to have considered
the other two links as well for their judgment. This can be
interpreted as an influence of the story agent’s mental state
on the participant’s causal representation of the event. Also
the finding of the agency question supports this interpretation:
even if the agent’s action caused the outcome, Tseltal and
Yucatec participants seem to be more willing to say that the
agent is not the cause of the outcome. This could be because,
for them, the agent’s intentionality toward the action and the
outcome plays a bigger role than for the German and Mexican
participants.
However, there is a pattern in the Tseltal data—a strong
contrast between the responses to the agency question and the
counterfactual question—that differs from that for all three of
the other cultures. The Tseltal responses to the agency question
more rarely attributed causality to the agent compared toGerman
and Yucatec responses (i.e., they provided more no-answers),
suggesting that the agent is not seen to be as much a source of
causality as in the data of the German or Yucatec participants.
Yet the majority of Tseltal responses to the counterfactual
question support the idea across all scenarios that the event
could only have happened if the agent were present. In other
words, they appear to be seeing the agent as less responsible in
the first case but as a prerequisite for the outcome to happen
in the second case. This unique pattern for Tseltal suggests the
possibility that Tseltal participants took a different perspective in
the counterfactual case, for example they might have viewed the
agent as an essential witness of the scenario who is important
for the story to be perceived and retold, and therefore, the
agent might be a prerequisite for each scenario13. What exactly
the implications are of this Tseltal response pattern for Tseltal
understandings of causality and agency clearly requires further
research.
The Temporal Question
The temporal question “Why did the outcome occur just
then?” aimed at generating an open answer. As mentioned, the
time criterion was crucial to avoid participants inferring other
potential causal links that were not provided in the original story.
The open answers participants gave were categorized in one of
six categories: (1) causal-story based, (2) causal-imposed, (3)
chance, (4) fate, (5) I don’t know, and (6) miscellaneous. A causal
representation of the agent would clearly be indicated by the first
category (see Section Materials for details). For the calculation of
the within-contrasts, we used a 2 (link present vs. link absent) ×
6 (type of explanation: causal-story based, causal imposed, fate,
chance, don’t know, miscellaneous) contingency table with 12
cells for each language group. For the between-contrasts, we used
a 2 (group 1 vs. group 2) × 6 (type of explanation: causal-story
based, causal imposed, fate, chance, don’t know, miscellaneous)
contingency table for the presence-case of each link. The results
are presented in Table 4.
13We are grateful to reviewer 2 for this interesting suggestion.
Comparison within Cultures
As in the responses to the other two questions, the A→O link
seems to be themost crucial one for the participants of all cultural
backgrounds when it comes to their causal representation of the
scenario. The answer pattern of all groups differed significantly
when scenarios in which the agent’s action caused the outcome
are compared with those in which it does not [German:
χ
2
(5, N= 128) = 49.88; p < 0.001, Tseltal: χ
2
(4, N= 128) = 18.58;
p < 0.001, Yucatec: χ2
(5, N= 128) = 41.76; p < 0.001, Mexican
Spanish: χ2
(2, N= 64) = 11.25; p = 0.01]. This is most likely
because of more answers categorized as “causal-story based” in
the first compared to the latter case.
Comparison between Cultures
If the A→O link is present, the answer pattern of the Tseltal
subjects differs significantly from that of the Yucatec subjects
[χ2
(5, N= 128) = 16.51; p = 0.005]. The analysis of the adjusted
standardized residuals shows that the Tseltal subjects more
often give a causal-story based answer compared to the Yucatec
subjects, whereas the Yucatec subjects give more fate-answers.
The comparison between all other groups revealed no significant
differences (all χ2 < 14.42, all p > 0.013, i.e., higher than the
necessary p-value of 0.008; see footnote 10).
If we now consider the I→A link, we notice that again,
the answer pattern of the Tseltal subjects differs significantly
from that of the Yucatec subjects [χ2
(5, N= 128) = 24.32; p <
0.001], and also from that of the Mexican Spanish subjects
[χ2
(4, N= 96) = 14.42; p = 0.006]. According to the adjusted
standardized residuals, this difference can likely be attributed
to the higher amount of causal-story based answers and the
lower amount of causal-imposed answers on the part of the
Tseltal subjects compared to the other two groups. Moreover,
the Yucatec participants gave more fate-answers than the Tseltal
participants (who never gave a fate answer, actually).
Finally, for the I→O link, as for the presence of the other two
links, the Tseltal participants’ answer pattern differs significantly
from those of the Yucatec subjects [χ2
(5, N= 128) = 25.92; p <
0.001] and the German subjects [χ2
(5, N= 128) = 16.0; p =
0.007]. Again, looking at the adjusted standardized residuals
suggests that this is because of more causal-story based answers
by the Tseltal subjects. For the comparison between the Tseltal
and the Yucatec subjects, the significant difference additionally
stems from the higher number of fate-answers on the part of
the Yucatec participants. In addition, the German subjects gave
more miscellaneous-answers compared to the Tseltal subjects.
The answer pattern of the German and Yucatec participants
also differs significantly [χ2
(5, N= 128) = 19.63; p = 0.001]. The
adjusted standardized residuals reveal that the two groups do not
differ regarding the amount of given causal-story based answers,
but rather regarding some other answers: whereas the German
participants give some chance answers, the Yucatec subjects more
often give causal-imposed and fate answers.
Summary
The clearest finding regarding the open answers the participants
gave in response to the temporal question is that the A→O
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TABLE 4 | Percentage of responses to the question “Why did the outcome occur just then (i.e., at that very moment)?” according to major categories of
responses for each language and for the presence and absence of each link.
Language A–O-link Type of response in %
Causal-story based Causal-imposed Chance Fate I don’t know Miscellaneous
German Present 75.00 0.00 12.50 1.56 1.56 9.38
Absent 18.75 28.13 20.31 9.38 12.50 10.94
Tseltal Present 92.19 1.56 1.56 0.00 3.13 1.56
Absent 62.50 17.19 14.06 0.00 4.69 1.56
Yucatec Present 67.19 7.81 3.13 12.50 1.56 7.81
Absent 15.63 42.19 1.56 28.13 6.25 6.25
Mexican Spanish Present 75.00 12.50 6.25 0.00 0.00 6.25
Absent 34.38 43.75 12.50 0.00 0.00 9.38
Language I–A-link Type of response in %
Causal-story based Causal-imposed Chance Fate I don’t know Miscellaneous
German Present 43.75 18.75 15.63 4.69 4.69 12.50
Absent 50.00 9.38 17.19 6.25 9.38 7.81
Tseltal Present 75.00 9.38 9.38 0.00 3.13 3.13
Absent 79.69 9.38 6.25 0.00 4.69 0.00
Yucatec Present 45.31 23.44 1.56 15.63 4.69 9.38
Absent 37.50 26.56 3.13 25.00 3.13 4.69
Mexican Spanish Present 46.88 37.50 6.25 0.00 0.00 9.38
Absent 62.50 18.75 12.50 0.00 0.00 6.25
Language I–O-link Type of response in %
Causal-story based Causal-imposed Chance Fate I don’t know Miscellaneous
German Present 48.44 10.94 14.06 6.25 6.25 14.06
Absent 45.31 17.19 18.75 4.69 7.81 6.25
Tseltal Present 73.44 14.06 6.25 0.00 4.69 1.56
Absent 81.25 4.69 9.38 0.00 3.13 1.56
Yucatec Present 46.88 23.44 0.00 20.31 1.56 7.81
Absent 35.94 26.56 4.69 20.31 6.25 6.25
Mexican Spanish Present 50.00 28.13 9.38 0.00 0.00 12.50
Absent 59.38 28.13 9.38 0.00 0.00 3.13
Note that each scenario was answered by 16 German, 16 Tseltal, 16 Yucatec, and 8 Mexican Spanish participants so that the percentages in each column refer to 64 German, 64
Tseltal, 64 Yucatec, and 32 Mexican Spanish answers
link determines whether a causal-story based answer is given
or not. It is interesting, however, that the Tseltal subjects give
many causal-story based answers irrespective of this link—
depending on the mental state of the agent (intention toward
the action and intention toward the outcome). These findings
seem to reflect in part the findings for the agency and the
counterfactual questions, for which it can likewise be concluded
that, for the Tseltal participants, mental states play a bigger role
in the identification of causality. For the Yucatec participants,
this conclusion can probably be drawn from the results of
the agency and counterfactual questions but not for the open
temporal question. Regarding the Yucatec, it is interesting that
fate seems to be an adequate explanation in several cases, whereas
neither the Tseltal nor the Mexican Spanish participants gave fate
answers.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this section we first present a summary of the main results
of our study with regard to the predictions made in Section
Predictions. Then, we point out some limitations of our study.
We also propose a linguistic analysis of the answers from the
open question before entering into a discussion of the cross-
cultural comparison of the conceptualization of causality, looking
in particular at the issue of the “magical thinking” principle from
a cross-cultural perspective.
Summary of the Results and Answers to
Predictions
In Section Predictions we presented a set of predictions which
we can now compare to our cross-cultural results. Regarding the
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first prediction about the importance of the Action-to-Outcome-
link, the reported findings suggest that, for the participants
of all four groups, this link is indeed the most crucial one
for the attribution of causality. Within each group and for all
three questions, this link determines whether the agent is seen
as cause (agency question), whether the outcome would have
happened even without the agent (counterfactual question) or
whether a causal story based answer is given or not (open,
temporal question). It can be concluded therefore that in general,
people from very different cultural backgrounds base their
causal attributions on more or less the same “mechanistic”
principle, i.e., whether there was a causal mechanism (an action
leading to an outcome in our examples) that produced an
outcome.
However, there are also differences between the answers of
the four cultural samples we compared that might shed light
on the validity of our second prediction, that is, if in every
culture the Action to Outcome link is equally important for
recognizing causation. It seems that the role of intentionality for
the perception of causality differs slightly across the four groups.
Whereas the German participants seem to attribute causality to
the agent whenever the A→O link is present, the Tseltal and
Yucatec participants sometimes do not see the agent as cause
although his action led to the outcome—depending on whether
intentionality to the action or to the outcome was present or not.
In particular, the open answers of the Tseltal subjects reveal that
causal story based answers were not limited to the presence of the
A→O link.
To sum up, these findings suggest that for the attribution
of causality, mental states like intentionality play a bigger role
for the Tseltal and Yucatec participants compared with the
German and Mexican Spanish subjects. Interestingly however,
the intentional dimension is not present in the linguistic answers
of the participants, as detailed in Section Linguistic Analysis of
Open Answers below.
Limitations of the Study
Because our study is original and exploratory in various aspects,
it has some limitations that we would like to point out for further
comparative work.
First, we designed eight scenarios with abstract structures that
were filled with different cover stories in order to prevent the task
from being confusing or annoying for participants. Despite our
best efforts, it seems that content did influence to some extent
the interpretation of certain scenarios. However, this limitation
is not critical for our study for two reasons. First, we could detect
some content effects, as in the case of dreams for the Yucatec
Mayas: some participants said, for example, that the man woke
up because he dreamt of the event about to happen, which is,
in accordance with the local concept of “fate”14. Second, content
14This type of explanation was used for answers to some puzzling outcomes when
the cover story implied a dream was under consideration. For instance, in scenario
4, the answer of one participant was that the man dreamed about the plates being
broken just before they were actually broken, and woke up even though he had not
heard them break. Precognition through dreams is an important principle, for it
also explains why, for the Yucatec Mayas, things are not construed to just happen
randomly and almost everything is ultimately attributed to “fate.”
effects were minimized because each abstract structure was filled
with different cover stories and tested with various participants
(see Appendix 1 of Supplementary Material on the structure of
the stories).
Sample size is another limitation that was almost inevitable in
our case. It should be noted that recruiting willing participants
in non-western nonacademic contexts is difficult and time-
consuming. Our results, however, can be seen as primary data
and future work can build on these findings.
Finally, a factor that could have been a limitation is that, while
for both Maya populations and for the Mexican one the answer
categories to the agency and counterfactual questions were read
to them only once at the beginning of the task, for the Germans
it was printed and thus available. It is possible therefore that
“maybe” was not as salient as a possible answer as in the printed
version. However, other studies run among the same Mayan
groups by the same researchers would seem to point to the fact
that not using “maybe” as an answer is habitual (Le Guen, 2006;
Le Guen and Pool Balam, 2012).
Linguistic Analysis of Open Answers
The question that drove this study is whether people in different
cultural groups have a similar understanding of causality
and whether and how different cultural groups conceptualize
exceptional, non-law-like relations between events (see Ojalehto
andMedin, 2015 for a review). Specifically, we wanted to establish
whether people from cultural settings other than the familiar
Indo-European ones have concepts like “chance,” “coincidence,”
or any other way to characterize non-obvious causal relations.
The results from our comparative study in four cultures through
the open, temporal question show that the construal of causality
is culturally and linguistically driven. We found that German and
Mexican students express non-law-like relations between events
using concepts such as Zufall or casualidad (“(by) chance”),
but neither of the Mayan groups expressed this idea, instead
expressing the same events in a different way. Further, although
the Mayan groups are culturally and linguistically related, they
seem to have different ideas when judging non-law-like relations
between events. Although both Mayan groups seem to put more
emphasis on agency, Tseltal Mayas tend to segment a causal link
into micro-causal links, i.e., enabling conditions that are distinct
from the mind of the agent; they use the concept of y-oloj “by
itself,” “of its own volition” to suggest, for example, that the
machete chopped the cornstalk down of its own accord without
any input from the man. Yucatec Mayas, in contrast, tend to
regard all events as predetermined and ultimately dictated by fate
(sweerte) and God’s will, i.e., independently of the mind of an
agent (or guiding it without his or her knowledge). We turn now
to the main concepts used in open answers in each language.
The German Notion of Zufall
In German, the notion of Zufall covers various concepts
glossed in English as “chance,” “randomness,” “accident” but also
“coincidence.” In the responses of German participants, Zufall
was used with all of those meanings.
In the German answers to the open, temporal question, the
concept of Zufall was used when some links between events were
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missing, in particular if the Action to Outcome was realized
without any intentionality. However, Zufall was also used if
there was only Intentionality to Outcome but without an Action
to Outcome link. Participants seem to have used it as an
explanation in non-causal scenarios to imply that there was “no
(obvious) cause” to the outcome (e.g., scenario 4), similarly to
the English idea of “coincidence,” but also in causal scenarios
to imply that the outcome was not intentional (like in scenario
6), closer to the notion of “accident” in English. Sometimes
Zufall was used to express the realization of the cause itself.
For instance, one answer to the question of why the outcome
happened when the action took place in Scenario 7 was literally
“through, by, or due to Zufall.” Another answer to Scenario
2 was: “[it happened] because of Zufall.” Such answers convey
the heterogeneous meanings of Zufall in German to express
the recognition of exceptional causation: on the one hand it
is used to express the absence of a cause in a given scenario,
on the other hand it is used—linguistically—to express a kind
of cause.
Notions of Coincidence and Chance in Spanish
Spanish, like other Indo-European languages, has several ways of
expressing the notion of non-law-like causal relations. Mexican
participants used the words coincidencia “coincidence” (sc. 2,
3), casualidad “(by) chance” (sc. 4, 6), buena suerte “good
luck” (sc. 7, 8) or accidentalmente “accidentally, by accident”
(sc. 5, 7). In this respect Spanish is not significantly different
from English or German. Because the language has words
to express cultural concepts of non-law-like relations between
events, participants have the resources to classify these events in
comparable categories.
Yucatec Maya and the Notion of Sweerte “fate”
There is no native lexicon in Yucatec Maya that relates to a
notion of non-law-like relations between events like “chance” or
“coincidence.” Lexical categories of this kind are borrowed from
Spanish, and have been semantically altered in the process from
their meanings in the source language.
One crucial notion is the one of sweerte “chance-fate.” The
word sweerte in Maya comes from the Spanish suerte meaning
“luck,” “chance” or “fortune.” However, when borrowed into
Maya, the term refers to some kind of chance but more generally
implies “fate.” Although sweerte in Maya can mean chance, it
seems that ultimately, Yucatec Mayas consider that everything
is meant to be, i.e., predetermined, so “good, bad or dumb
luck” is written or determined by God. It is not uncommon
to hear in everyday conversation regarding positive but also
dramatic events (e.g., someonemarrying an old lover or someone
falling from a ladder to end up dead) the following expression:
bey usweerte máak “that’s people’s fate” or usweerte beya “it
was his/her fate like this,” meaning that what happened to the
person in question was his/her fate regardless of circumstances
or his/her will. This idea was very explicit in many Yucatec
Mayan participants’ responses as well as in interviews conducted
after the task: although the first meaning “luck” actually refers
to “punctual luck” (e.g., the hunter while cleaning his gun,
shoots the deer), ultimately, more detailed explanation leads
participants to say that it was fate. So luck is only a superficial
reading of the event and not an explanatory recourse, ultimately
everything can be explained by fate. In the counterfactual
case, some participants agreed that the deer would have died
anyway, maybe not in these particular circumstances but it
would have died at this particular moment and the hunter
would have killed a deer, maybe not this particular deer, but
one deer.
In Yucatec Maya there is no word that encodes the concept
of coincidence, although there are ways to express non-law-
like relations (e.g., pointing to the simultaneity of events). One
way is to use terms like “to think” or “to guess” with negation
to refer to unplanned or fortuitous events. For Yucatec Mayas,
foreseeing events or places (i.e., precognition) is considered to
be actually possible. It is common to listen to people talking
about dreams they have had about future events or distant
places (see Groark, 2009 for a similar analysis among the Tsotsil
Mayas).
The Tseltal Language of Causality and Non-causal
Events
Tseltal has a range of ways of expressing “no causal outcome.”
Although there are no words in Tseltal for “by chance”
or “accidentally,” related ideas can be expressed using other
expressions such as jowil “for no reason, to no (good) purpose,”
ma’yuk y-ajwal “there was no “owner” (of the deed), no one made
it happen,” or s-tukel “by itself, without external agent.”
In contrast to Yucatec Maya, however, Tseltal Mayas in this
task did not express strong views about fate or predetermined
outcomes as an explanation for events. Instead, answers from
Tseltal participants tended to decompose causal links into smaller
causal chains. In particular, they used constructions with y-oloj
which can be translated as “on purpose, deliberately, of his/its
own volition.” While prototypically this term is used to explicitly
attribute intentionality to an agent (“He did it on purpose”),
interestingly—and this is where the semantics differs from the
English glosses—even inanimate things can make things happen
“on purpose” or “by their own volition.” The expression y-
oloj is somewhat close to English “responsibility”—who is to be
held responsible for making the thing happen. This expression
is usually used to attribute responsibility for something bad
happening, and differs from English “responsibility” in that it can
apply to inanimates. For instance, one’s heart will be “responsible”
if one has a heart attack or it will be the mud, if one falls in the
mud, etc. (see also Polian, forthcoming).
Tseltal participants had no difficulty in not attributing
intentionality to the actor described in the task scenarios;
they tended to generally break causal links into smaller ones
suggesting that the presence of the agent’s intention is not
necessary to their interpretation. Hence in scenarios where
the Action to Outcome link is not present (scenarios 2, 6, 7,
and 8), Tseltal participants tended to use y-oloj “on its own
responsibility,” bypassing the agent in favor of another element in
the event chain to characterize non-intentional causality. Using
this concept of y-oloj in these contexts seems to skip over the
mental state (they do not need to pay attention to the agents’
intentions) and attribute causal force to another link in the chain
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(e.g., to the instrument, or to the conditions in which the event
occurred).
Cross-cultural Comparison of the
Conceptualization of Causality
As already mentioned, it was frequently claimed by early
ethnographers that members of many non-western cultural
groups base a lot of their daily behavior on the principle of
“magical thinking,” mostly related to various kinds of taboos
(Frazer, 1911; Lévy-Bruhl, 1922; Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Lévi-
Strauss, 1990; Malinowski, 1992). It was especially emphasized
by Evans-Pritchard that not only do assumed causes for specific
events differ across cultures, but also the coincidence of selected
events (for example, people sitting down, a granary collapsing)
require an explanation. For people in most “western” cultures, it
might be seen as “bad luck” for the particular Azande individuals
who happened to be sitting beneath a granary which suddenly
collapsed due to termites—the causal explanation of the granary
collapsing (termites) and the reason why people had been
sitting under this particular granary (sun protection) would be
considered to be independent from one another. For the Azande,
however, “[w]itchcraft explains the coincidence of these two
events” (Evans-Pritchard, 1937, p. 70).
Although magical thinking can be seen to be present at times
in every human group, in “western” cultures it is considered as
superstitious and is generally denigrated, as among the German
students in our case. It is however construed as a legitimate cause
for illness and certain other outcomes among the Yucatec Mayas,
for instance. Results from our task show that intentionality alone
was not a sufficient criterion for participants of any of the
groups to attribute causality. Nonetheless, for the agency and
counterfactual questions intentionality played a slightly more
important role for the Yucatec, and even more for the Tseltal,
than for the German and Mexican Spanish participants.
These results taken together imply that, although magical
thinking can be taken to be a legitimate operating principle in
certain cultures, it is not applicable to all domains or situations:
it might be a legitimate sole cause to explain illness or death, but
not in more everyday situations like the ones presented in our
scenarios. In other words, thinking of an outcome is not always
considered sufficient to determine causality, or more precisely,
thinking is not always performative (Austin, 1975).
CONCLUSION
Anthropologists as well as other social scientists often report
that the way causality is inferred and interpreted is to some
degree culturally shaped. Although it is not difficult to imagine
how culture can influence the construal of causal relations
between social actions and their effects (social causality), it is
not always easy to demonstrate it through the collection of
systematic data. Recent attempts to do so cross-culturally have
shown that culture can influence attributions of causality even
in sequences of physical events (physical causality; Bender and
Beller, 2011a). Our cross-cultural study among four different
groups is a comparable approach. Our results reveal a similar
recognition of causality, showing that in all groups the Action-to-
Outcome link was the most important for construing causality,
more so than the Intention-to-Outcome or the Intention-to-
Action links.
However, aside from these similarities there are very different
interpretations cross-culturally of the relation between a cause
and an outcome. What is striking from our study is the
divergence in interpretation of exceptional (causal) relations
across groups. While German and Mexican Spanish speakers
have linguistic and cultural non-law-like concepts like Zufall
or casualidad “chance, coincidence,” the two Mayan groups do
not. In the Tseltal case, events are often seen as intermediary
causes having “their own volition” (y-oloj) while Yucatec Mayas
reject coincidences and attribute everything ultimately to “fate”
(sweerte) and God’s will. The interpretation of non-law-like
relationship explanations and hence the distinction between
causal relations and accidental sequences thus strongly depends
on the cultural setting.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
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REFERENCES
Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychol. Bull.
126, 556–574. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.126.4.556
Alicke, M. D., Buckingham, J., Zell, E., and Davis, T. (2008). Culpable control and
counterfactual reasoning in the psychology of blame. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull.
34, 1371–1381. doi: 10.1177/0146167208321594
Astuti, R., and Bloch, M. (2015). The causal cognition of wrong
doing: incest, intentionality and morality. Front. Psychol. 6:136. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00136
Atran, S., Medin, D. L., Ross, N., Lynch, E., Vapnarsky, V., Ucan Ek, E., et al.
(2002). Folkecology, cultural epidemiology, and the spirit of the commons.
Curr. Anthropol. 43, 421–450. doi: 10.1086/339528
Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do things with words. Edited by J. O.
Urmson and M. Sbisá. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.001.0001
Bang, M., Medin, D. L., and Atran, S. (2007). Cultural mosaics and mental
models of nature. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 13868–13874. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0706627104
Bender, A., and Beller, S. (2011a). Causal asymmetry across cultures: assigning
causal roles in symmetric physical settings. Front. Psychol. 2:231. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00231
Bender, A., and Beller, S. (2011b). The cultural constitution of cognition: taking
the anthropological perspective. Front. Psychol. 2:67. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.
00067
Bender, A., and Beller, S. (2013). Cognition is . . . fundamentally cultural. Behav. Sci.
3, 42–54. doi: 10.3390/bs3010042
Bender, A., Beller, S., and Medin, D. L. (2012). Turning tides: prospects for more
diversity in cognitive science. Top. Cogn. Sci. 4, 462–466. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-
8765.2012.01202.x
Berlin, B., and Kay, P. (1969). Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1645
Le Guen et al. Making sense of (exceptional) causal relations
Bloch, M. E. F. (1998). HowWe Think They Think. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Bohnemeyer, J., and Pederson, E. (eds.) (2011). Event Representation in
Language and Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511782039
Chisholm, R. M. (1966). “Freedom and action,” in Freedom and Determinism, ed K
Lehrer (New York, NY: Random House), 28–44.
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., and Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution
across cultures: variation and universality. Psychol. Bull. 125, 47–63. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.125.1.47
Cushman, F. (2008). Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal
and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition 108, 353–380. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006
Evans, N. (2009). “Your mind in mine: social cognition in grammar,” in Dying
Words (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell), 69–80.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1937). Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frazer, J. G. (1911). The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. London:
Macmillan and Co.
Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. Philos. Rev. 66, 377–388. doi: 10.2307/2182440
Groark, K. P. (2009). Discourses of the soul: the negotiation of personal agency
in Tzotzil Maya dream narrative. Am. Ethnol. 36, 705–721. doi: 10.1111/j.1548-
1425.2009.01205.x
Gumperz, J., and Levinson, S. C. (1996). Rethinking Linguistic Relativity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hardin, C. L., and Maffi, L. (1997). Color Categories in Thought and Language.
Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the
world? Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 61–83. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
Hume, D. (2003). A Treatise of Human Nature. New York, NY: Dover.
Kwon, I. (2012). Korean forward causality in basic communicative spaces
network: -ese and -nikka constructions. Discourse Cogn. 19, 1–27. doi:
10.15718/discog.2012.19.1.1
Lagnado, D. A., and Channon, S. (2008). Judgments of cause and blame:
the effects of intentionality and foreseeability. Cognition 108, 754–770. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009
Lagnado, D. A., Waldman, M. R., Hagmayer, Y., and Sloman, S. A.
(2007). “Beyond covariation: cues to causal structure,” in Causal
learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation, eds. A. Gopnik
and L. Schulz (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press), 154–172. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176803.003.0011
Landis, J. R., and Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for
categorical data. Biometrics 33, 159–174.
Le Guen, O. (2006). L’organisation et L’apprentissage de L’espace Chez les Mayas
Yucatèques du Quintana Roo, Mexique. Ph.D. thesis. Université Paris X-
Nanterre.
Le Guen, O., and Pool Balam, L. I. (2012). No metaphorical timeline in
gesture and cognition among yucatec mayas. Front. Psychol. 3:271. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00271
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Yélî dnye and the theory of basic color terms. J. Linguist.
Anthropol. 1, 3–55. doi: 10.1525/jlin.2000.10.1.3
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1990). La Pensée Sauvage, revised Édn. Paris: Pocket.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1922). Les Fonctions Mentales Dans les Socieìteìs Infeìrieures. Paris:
Alcan.
Lucy, J. A. (1992). Grammatical Categories and Cognition: A Case of Study of the
Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511620713
Malinowski, B. (1992). Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays. Prospect
Heights, IL: Waveland Pr Inc.
Morris, M. W., Nisbett, R. E., and Peng, K. (1995). “Causal attribution
across domains and cultures,” in Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate
Symposia of the Fyssen Foundation, eds D. Sperber, D. Premack, and A.
J. Premack (New York, NY: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press),
577–614.
Morris, M. W., and Peng, K. (1994). Culture and cause: American and Chinese
attributions for social and physical events. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 949–971.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.949
Ojalehto, B. L., and Medin, D. L. (2015). Perspectives on culture and
concepts. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 66, 249–275. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-
015120
Ojalehto, B., Waxman, S. R., and Medin, D. L. (2013). Teleological reasoning
about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives? Trends Cogn. Sci.
17, 166–171. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.02.006
Pizarro, D. A., Uhlmann, E., and Bloom, P. (2003). Causal deviance and the
attribution of moral responsibility. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 39, 653–660. doi:
10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00041-6
Polian, G. (forthcoming). Diccionario Multidialectal del Tseltal. Mexico: CIESAS.
Sanders, T., Spooren, W. P. M., and Noordman, L. G. M. (2009). Coherence
relations in a cognitive theory of discourse representation. Cogn. Linguist. 4,
93–134. doi: 10.1515/cogl.1993.4.2.93
Sanders, T., and Sweetser, E. (2009). Causal Categories in Discourse and Cognition.
Berlin; Boston, MA: De Gruyter Mouton.
San Roque, L., Gawne, L., Hoenigman, D., Miller, J. C., Rumsey, A., Spronck, S.,
et al. (2012). Getting the story straight: Language fieldwork using a narrative
problem-solving task. Lang. Doc. Conserv. 6, 135–174. Available online at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10125/4504
Sapir, E. (1933). “Language,” in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed E. A.
Seligman (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing), 155–169.
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/cbo9781139173452
Shaver, K. (1895). The Attribution of Blame: Causality, Responsibility, and
Blameworthiness. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
Sousa, P. (2009). A cognitive approach to moral responsibility: the
case of a failed attempt to kill. J. Cogn. Cult. 9, 171–194. doi:
10.1163/156770909X12489459066183
Sperber, D., Premack, D., and Premack, A. J. (1996). Causal Cognition: A
Multidisciplinary Approach. Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., and Moll, H. (2005).
Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. Behav.
Brain Sci. 28, 675–691. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X05000129
Waldmann, M. R., and Hagmayer, Y. (2001). Estimating causal strength: the
role of structural knowledge and processing effort. Cognition 82, 27–58. doi:
10.1016/S0010-0277(01)00141-X
Whorf, B. (1956). Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin
Lee Whorf. 1st M.I.T. Press Paperback Edn. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
Wolff, P. (2003). Direct causation in the linguistic coding and individuation
of causal events. Cognition 88, 1–48. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(03)
00004-0
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Le Guen, Samland, Friedrich, Hanus and Brown. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1645
